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This thesis will present an analysis of how the concept of Piecemeal Social Engineering 
developed by Karl Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) and in The Poverty of 
Historicism (1957) can be translated from a philosophical notion into a practical attitude. This 
application of Piecemeal Social Engineering into a practical context raises some challenges, 
some of which this thesis will look more in depth. The aim of this thesis is therefore to analyse 
three proposed general problems occurring upon the practical application of Piecemeal Social 
Engineering, as well as to answer the question of whether it is possible or not to act in order to 
solve them and how. 
The three problems presented will be divided into ‘structural’ and ‘non-structural’ 
issues. While it is not possible to act directly upon structural issues since they are negative 
externalities of the application of Piecemeal Social Engineering, it is possible to reduce them 
with the continuous application of this method while gaining efficiency from direct experience. 
On the other hand, despite being ‘unnatural’ to the Piecemeal approach, non-structural issues 
are liable to be tackled by direct intervention, having a concrete solution. In order to unveil the 
solution to non-structural problems, it will be analysed whether contemporary Open Societies 
are sabotaging its fundamental feature of critical reasoning. It will be deduced that the way into 
the solution to this problem is to rebuild a strong critical reasoning framework within the Open 
Society, and to use it not only inside the Open Society but to the Open Society framework itself. 
This endeavour will be based on the idealistic dimension of Piecemeal Social Engineering 
corresponding to the Tradition of Liberty which not only coexists, but is in fact the foundation 
for the emergence of individual blueprints within a single Open Society. 
 
Word Count Dissertation (excluding footnotes): 18.381 
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 In The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) and in The Poverty of Historicism (1957) 
the philosopher Karl Popper identified two different attitudes towards Social Engineering – 
Utopian and Piecemeal – which constitute two distinct approaches to the way men can interact 
with social structures in order to alter them. While being recognized by K. Popper that the 
piecemeal attitude is the only rational approach to social engineering, the study of how it is 
translated from a philosophical concept into practice becomes in this context paramount. The 
application of Piecemeal Social Engineering into a practical context raises some challenges, 
some of which this thesis will look forward to look more in depth. The aim of this thesis is 
therefore to analyse three proposed general problems occurring due to the practical application 
of Piecemeal Social Engineering, as well as to answer the question of whether it is possible to or 
not to act in order to solve them. While the disclosure of the solutions to the three proposed 
issues is within the scope of this thesis, a more comprehensive analysis of the solutions is 
outside its scope due to its superior complexity. 
 The first chapter of this thesis aims at introducing the concepts which will be used 
during the whole analysis. In a first instance the concepts of Popperian Open Society and of 
Closed Society will be presented and contrasted. While the former concept regards the existence 
of a critical attitude within a certain society, the second avoids the emergence of criticism. 
Secondly, the enemies of the Open Society – Historicism and Utopianism – will be analysed, 
and understood the relation between them and the Open Society. A following section will be 
dedicated to a more comprehensive study of Utopian Social Engineering since during the entire 
thesis this concept will be used to counterbalance the practical application of Piecemeal Social 
Engineering in order to understand how both differ in attempting to interact with social 
structures. Thirdly in this chapter, the concept of Piecemeal Social Engineering will be analysed 
as well as the concept of Piecemeal Technology which provides a frame from where the 
Piecemeal approach may flourish. Finally, Utopianism and Piecemeal Social Engineering will 
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be contrasted and the important distinction between ‘utopian blueprints’ and ‘piecemeal 
purposes’ will be presented. 
 The second chapter of this thesis will provide certain considerations important to take 
into account if one is to apply the concept of Piecemeal Social Engineering to practice. It will 
analyse the how the vagueness of the piecemeal concept makes it harder to understand in detail 
how it can be applied to practice but that this vagueness is also intentional: without it, a set of 
guidelines to apply this attitude in practice would resemble a utopian blueprint and lead us to 
the Utopianist realm. This chapter will also aim at exploring that the concept of Piecemeal 
Social Engineering is necessarily framed within an Open Society and that Liberal Democracy is 
the closest practical application of Piecemeal Social Engineering in contemporary societies. 
 The third chapter of this thesis will present three challenges to the practical application 
of Piecemeal Social Engineering. The first problem corresponds to the ‘Immediate and 
Permanent Adjustments’ issue, which has to do with the impossibility to extinguish the time gap 
between the moment where one acts in order to tackle a concrete evil and the corresponding 
result of such action. This gap may lead to the worsening of the evil and consequently, to a 
potentially dangerous increase of intervention. Secondly, the ‘Arbitrariness’ Problem has to do 
with the coexistence within the Open Society of measures in favour and against a certain policy, 
leading to neutral results or to the impossibility to act at all. Finally, the ‘Motivation Problem’ 
portrays the difficulty of Piecemeal Social Engineering in presenting itself as a more attractive 
alternative to Utopianism due to the powerful motivational allure of the utopian blueprint, 
particularly in times of great social struggle. 
 The fourth chapter will aim at unveiling the solution to these problems. While the 
‘Immediate and Permanent Adjustment’ and ‘Arbitrariness’ problems are considered to be 
structural, the ‘Motivation Problem’ is depicted as non-structural. Although it is not possible to 
act directly upon structural issues since they are negative externalities regarding the application 
of Piecemeal Social Engineering, it is possible to reduce them by continuously applying this 
method and gaining efficiency from direct experience. On the other hand, non-structural issues 
despite being more dangerous since they are ‘unnatural’ to the Piecemeal approach, it is 
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possible to act from the exterior in order to tackle them. In order to unveil the solution to the 
‘Motivation’ problem, this chapter analyses that the contemporary Open Societies may be 
sabotaging its fundamental feature of critical reasoning. The way into the solution to this 
problem is then to rebuild a strong critical reasoning framework within the Open Society, and to 
use it not only to make improvements by trial and error to the conjectures within the Open 
Society, but to use this Popperian scientific method of conjectures and refutations to the Open 
Society itself, while defying that Liberal Democracy and the Open Society are the final 
destination from the path that started in the Closed Society. 
 Finally, the conclusion of this thesis will provide the understanding that Piecemeal 
Social Engineering does have an idealistic dimension such as Utopian Social Engineering does, 
but which is not however in the form of a static and collective utopian blueprint. It is in the form 
of an ideal and corresponds to the Tradition of Liberty. This idealistic dimension of Piecemeal 
Social Engineering not only coexists, but it is also the foundation for the emergence of 

















Chapter I – Friends and Foes of the Open Society 
 
1. Brief Contextualization: The Concept of Popperian Open Society 
 The “Open Society
1
” is a concept developed by Karl Popper in The Open Society and 
Its Enemies (1945)
2
. It portrays a society which “sets free the critical powers of man”
3
, where 
the ability to exert the use of critical reason is most highly valued. It is a society open to 
criticism, where within a democratic atmosphere
4
 each individual is free to express their own 
critical views towards the existing conjectures, being also free to proceed to their refutation. 
Hence, the Open Society is a dynamic arena of conjectures and refutations built upon the critical 
exercise of reason and within a democratic environment. 
 The Open Society is opposed to the “Closed Society” which is characterized by “the 
belief in magical taboos”
5
. In the Closed Society, individuals legitimate their source of 
authority not by an individual sense of responsibility in choosing between the existing options 
before a democratic consensus is reached, but rather on the belief that a mystical or natural 
higher force is on the control of such society, regardless of the actions taken by each individual. 
The Closed Society is therefore closed to criticism, where the unquestioned belief in a higher 
source of power guides the way of living. It is a society adverse to change, teaching that 
“change is evil, and that rest is divine”
6
.  
  In The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945)
7
, K. Popper aims at describing the arduous 
transition from the Closed to the Open Society, analyzing the ‘enemies’ who hinder this 
                                                          
1
 According to K. Popper, the concept of ‘Open Society’ was firstly introduced by Henri Bergson in Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion (1935). This author however insists in a more religious and moral 
characterization of the Open Society and in its distinction from the ‘Closed Society’. According to K. 
Popper, other authors such as Walter Lippmann also referred to the concept of ‘Open Society’ (see 
LIPPMANN, W. (1943). The good society. 1937 ed. New York, Grosset & Dunlap.). 
2
 The concept appears in both volumes of The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945). 
3
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [xvii] 
4
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [xviii] 
5
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [216] 
6
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd.Paul [37] 
7
 The transition from the Closed to the Open society is present in both volumes of this work dated 1945. 
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process, attempting to drive civilization back to the closed society, abandoning the use of 
critical reasoning. 
 In the next sections of this chapter it will be provided a description of two of the most 
dangerous enemies of the Open Society – Historicism and Utopianism – and of the greatest 
friend of the Open Society – Piecemeal Social Engineering. In order to proceed to a proper 
reflection of the practical application of Piecemeal Social Engineering undertaken in the 
following chapters of this thesis, this chapter will particularly emphasize the analysis of both 
Utopian and Piecemeal approaches to social engineering. The aim of this present chapter is 
therefore to offer an introduction to the concepts approached and to provide a contrast between 
the two types of social engineering presented by K. Popper, in order to gain a deeper insight into 
the nature of the concept of Piecemeal Social Engineering as a practical attitude.  
 
2. The Enemies of the Open Society: From Historicism to Utopian Social Engineering 
2.1. Historicism 
 The Historicist doctrine constitutes the first enemy to the Open Society presented by K. 
Popper
8
. It can be characterized by a particular attitude towards the scientific approach to the 
social sciences, namely in regard to the interpretation of social development. It is a doctrine 
which establishes that “history is controlled by specific historical or evolutionary laws whose 
discovery would enable us to prophesy the destiny of man.”
9
 To this extent, the scientific role of 
the social sciences is the discovery of “the ‘rhythms’ or the ‘patterns’, the ‘laws’ or the 
‘trends’”
 10
 which allow the prediction of the future unravelling through the historical tissue. 
 The premise that history unfolds according to certain inexorable laws of destiny is 
therefore accepted by historicists. Men become mere puppets of an omnipotent historical 
framework and impotent to bring about any social changes. This degree of powerlessness may 
vary from extreme out-and-out Historicism to less severe forms of this doctrine which allow 
                                                          
8
 In The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) and more explicitly in The Poverty of Historicism (1957) 
9
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd.Paul [4] 
10




some degree of ‘activism’’
11
, of the ability to act and to interfere with “human affairs”
12
 while 





 in the inexorable laws of history condemns social sciences to become mere 
static observers of the unfolding of these laws, being impossible to interact with them and to 
alter their course. In this context, History is considered the only empirical source of knowledge, 
and sociology
15
 is reduced to the formulation of long-term predictions, aiming to foresee the 
future course of historical events. “Sociology thus becomes, to the historicist, an attempt to 
solve the old problem of foretelling the future … It is the science of things to come, of impending 
developments.”
16
 Hence, according to the historicist method, the social sciences would adopt a 
passive approach towards their object of study. They would only engage into historical 
observation in order to make future predictions rather than in relying on historical experience 
and on sociological experiments in order to “look for the various laws which impose limitations 
upon the construction of social institutions, or for other uniformities”
17
. This latter attitude 
towards social sciences opposes Historicism or at least the more extreme forms of Historicism 
and can be defined as social engineering. The idea underneath this approach is “the planning 
and construction of institutions, with the aim, perhaps, or arresting or of controlling or of 
quickening impending social developments”
18
. If out-and-out forms of Historicism regard social 
                                                          
11
 POPPER, K. R. (1957). The poverty of historicism. 2002 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Ltd. [6-7] 
12
 POPPER, K. R. (1957). The poverty of historicism. 2002 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Ltd. [6] 
13
 POPPER, K. R. (1957). The poverty of historicism. 2002 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Ltd. [6-7] 
14
 Either from an ‘optimistic’ or ‘fatalistic’ acceptance of Historicism it counsels us to submit the study of 
social sciences to the laws of historical development (in POPPER, K. R. (1957). The poverty of 
historicism. 2002 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. [45]), in the sense that Historical Laws 
may be perceived as the progress into an increasingly better social condition or from a fatalistic approach 
since “historicism teaches the futility of any attempt to alter impeding changes” (in POPPER, K. R. 
(1957). The poverty of historicism. 2002 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. [46]) 
15
 POPPER, K. R. (1957). The poverty of historicism. 2002 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Ltd. [35] 
16
 POPPER, K. R. (1957). The poverty of historicism. 2002 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Ltd. [37-38] 
17
 POPPER, K. R. (1957). The poverty of historicism. 2002 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Ltd. [41] 
18




planning and activism worthless “under the superior sway of historical forces”
19
, less extreme 
forms of Historicism can indeed accept to some extent, the possibility for men to intervene in 
the historical tissue.  
 If on the one hand “an uncompromising and fully developed historicism would hesitate 
to admit that man, by any effort, can alter the laws of historical destiny even after he has 
discovered them” and “it would hold that he cannot work against them, since all his plans and 
actions are means by which the inexorable laws of development realize his historical destiny”
20
, 
a softer version of Historicism is compatible
21
 with social engineering. 
 K. Popper also argues that beyond compatible, the “most obvious alternative to an out-
and-out historicism”
22
 is what he termed “Utopianism” or “Utopian Social Engineering”. 
Hence, by being a “convincing and attractive”
23
 doctrine and “the kind of methodological 
approach to attract all those who are either unaffected by historicist prejudices or reacting 
against them”
24
, Utopianism is considered by the author “more dangerous, and its criticism 
more imperative.”
25
 It is in this context of less severe cases of Historicism that Utopianism 
breaks through. Although it is not exclusively necessary that all utopian thinkers are also 
Historicists, this “combination is representative of quite a number of social and political 





                                                          
19
 POPPER, K. R. (1957). The poverty of historicism. 2002 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Ltd. [40] 
20
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [19] 
21
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [167] 
22
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [166] 
23
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [167] 
24
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [167] 
25
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [167], see also Ibid. [166], where K. Popper states directly it is “the most dangerous” 
approach towards politics. 
26
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [22] 
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2.2. Utopian Social Engineering (or Utopianism) 
 Utopian Social Engineering is the second enemy of the Open Society analysed in this 
thesis. It was previously seen that it emerges as an alternative to Historicism, although it is 
compatible with softer forms of this doctrine. It aims at designing and acting upon social 
institutions, denying the absolute impotence of men towards the historical laws of destiny. 
 Utopianism is based on the creed that it is possible to reach an ideal state of society 
portrayed by a utopian blueprint. This blueprint is rationally chosen and constitutes the 
culmination of the work of the utopian engineer. Utopian engineering aims at channelling all the 
resources and efforts from a given society to the accomplishment of the blueprint which is 
continuously and consciously pursued. K. Popper highlights the difference between ‘final’ and 
‘intermediary’ steps in the pursuit of the utopian end
27
. While the final step corresponds to the 
utopian blueprint itself, the intermediary steps are necessary milestones, crucial to reach the 
blueprint. These intermediary steps are not dispensable; they are part of the process to achieve 
the utopian blueprint, not being ends in themselves. 
 In “Æstheticism, Perfectionism, Utopianism”
28
, K. Popper provided an extensive 
criticism of Utopian Social Engineering, which will be further analysed in four topics. This 
analysis will provide a further understanding of the distinguishing features of Utopianism and 
why it is considered to be the most dangerous approach towards politics
29
. 
 The first important aspect to take into consideration, is that in order to implement a 
blueprint that would culminate into an ideal state, a strong centralized leadership is needed and 
is likely to lead to an authoritarian government
30
 with the rule of a few.  Although the utopian 
blueprint is many times designed to accomplish high ideals of happiness or freedom for all, the 
benevolent dictator will face issues regarding the lag between his original ‘good’ intentions and 
the criticism that some individuals may present due to the fact that a certain blueprint may not 
                                                          
27
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [166-178] 
28
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [166-167] 
29
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [166] 
30
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [169] 
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represent – and it most probably does not – the same standard of ideal society for everyone. The 
benevolent dictator will hence be obliged to suppress dissident opinions and criticism so that the 
‘perfect plan’ can be implemented. The problem is that not only “unreasonable objections” but 
also “reasonable criticism” will be neglected, leading the dictator to a situation where “without 
some such check, he can hardly find out whether his measures achieve the desired benevolent 
aim”
31
. This situation can escalate to another where violence is used in order to annihilate all 
criticism, as ultimately, from the benevolent dictator’s eyes, the responsibility for the 
unsuccessful achievement of the ‘high moral ideal’ embodied in the blueprint will be of those 
who resist the implementation of such plan, and therefore, of such ‘high moral ideal’. 
 The second problem of Utopian Engineering is of the “dictator’s successor”. This 
problem arises from the fact that the time span needed for the full implementation of the 
blueprint will largely exceed that of the lifetime of the benevolent dictator. Hence, he will be 
faced with the need to find another equally benevolent dictator to continue the project. 
However, “if the successors do not pursue the same ideal, then all the sufferings of the people 
for the sake of the ideal may have been in vain.”
32
 K. Popper argues that the realization of a 
Utopian Blueprint would require not only “the Platonic belief in one absolute and unchanging 
ideal” but also the rational methods to determine what that ideal is and the determination of the 
best means for its realization. He then settles that “only such far-reaching assumptions could 
prevent us from declaring the Utopian methodology to be utterly futile”
33
 arguing that even the 
most ardent Platonists would acknowledge that there is no rational method to compose the aim, 
other than one based on intuition, leading him to his conclusion: “any difference of opinion 
between Utopian engineers must therefore lead, in the absence of rational methods, to the use of 
power instead of reason, i.e. to violence.”
34
 
                                                          
31
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [169] 
32
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [169-170] 
33
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [170] 
34
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [171] 
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 The third problem of Utopian Engineering emphasised by K. Popper and somehow 
related to the previous one is that “Utopian plans will never be realized in the way they were 
conceived, because hardly any social action ever produces precisely the result expected.”
35
 
 Finally, the fourth issue of Utopian Engineering can be illustrated by Montsequieu’s 
idea of a despotic government: "When the savages of Louisiana wish to have fruit, they cut the 
tree at the bottom and gather the fruit. That is exactly a despotic government."
36
 Utopian 
engineers are also moved by the impetus to cut the tree at the bottom and gather the fruit. If the 
fruit can be embodied by the implementation of a blueprint, the act of cutting the tree at the 
bottom is analogous to what K. Popper referred to as “canvas cleaning” which is “the 
conviction that one has to go to the very root of social evil, that nothing short of a complete 
eradication of the offending social system will do if we wish to ‘bring any decency into the 
world’”
37
. This idea was already present in the second issue where the benevolent dictator 
would ultimately violently suppress all sorts of criticism in order to “bring decency into the 
world”. Canvas cleaning is related to an uncompromising radicalism
38
 and has a particular shade 
worth analysing – æstheticism. Æstheticism is “the desire to build a world which is not only a 
little better and more rational than ours, but which is free from all its ugliness: not a crazy 
quilt, and old garment badly patched, but an entirely new gown, a really beautiful new 
world.”
39
 K. Popper recognizes that we may all “suffer a little from such dreams of perfection” 
but if it is not backed by reason, by responsibility and a sense of humanity it becomes “a 
dangerous enthusiasm, liable to develop into a form of neurosis or hysteria”
40
 which will propel 
the utopian dictator to eradicate the old ‘evil’ institutions, traditions and elements of the old 
society in order to establish new ‘good’ society, moved by a sense of purification. This 
                                                          
35
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [173] 
36
 Chapter XIII from  MONTESQUIEU, C. D. S., NUGENT, T., PRICHARD, J. V., COLE, G. D. H., & 
ROUSSEAU, J.-J. (1955). The spirit of laws. Chicago, Encyclopædia Britannica. 
37
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [174] 
38
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [174] 
39
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [174] 
40
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [174] 
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unrestrained radicalism and æstheticism replace rational reasoning by “a desperate hope for 
political miracles”
41
 that can only be regarded as irrational as this “intoxication with dreams of 
a beautiful world” will always appeal “to our emotions rather than to reason”
42
. To this, K. 
Popper designates as Romanticism. Romanticism can also be associated with the belief that in a 
certain unknown future moment the dream “of the apocalyptic revolution” will “radically 
transfigure the whole social world.”
43
 This irrational belief, or rather faith, that a perfect future 
will take place in an unknown time frame, is therefore another characteristic of Romanticism. 
To this faith, K. Popper refers to as “faith in dogmatic reason”. 
 
3. Piecemeal Social Engineering: The Friend of the Open Society 
 The concept of Piecemeal Social Engineering appears as the opposing force to Utopian 
Social Engineering according to K. Popper. It is presented by the author not only as the single 
rational
44
 alternative to Utopian Social Engineering, but ultimately as the only alternative at all 
since the practical enforcement of Utopianism is unfeasible according to the author. This is so 
because the idealized blueprint goes beyond the limits of possibility, always creating unintended 
consequences in the midst of the process of the practical materialization of the utopian 
blueprint, requiring the utopian engineer to improvise in order to tackle such unexpected issues, 
thus leading him to a sloppy application of what is essentially Piecemeal Social Engineering in 
order to systematically tinker the blueprint
45
. 
 The first thing important to take into account when analysing the concept of Piecemeal 
Social Engineering is that it admits that “perfection, if at all attainable, is far distant, and that 
every generation of men, and therefore also the living, have a claim; perhaps not so much a 
claim to be made happy, for there are no institutional means of making a man happy, but a 
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claim not to be made unhappy, where it can be avoided.”
46
  This idea is related to the non-
existence of any idealistic blueprint in Piecemeal Social Engineering aiming at designing 
society as a whole. In fact, the piecemeal social engineer “does not believe in the method of re-
designing [society] as a whole. Whatever his ends, he tries to achieve them by small adjustments 
and re-adjustments which can be continuously improved upon. His ends may be of diverse 
kinds”
47
 for he does not have to have a pre-established blueprint to guide his political agenda. 
 Piecemeal Social Engineering accepts that men have the power to change the present 
situation and denies that human activities are dependent on historical forces or laws of destiny 
characterized by an immutable character. The Piecemeal Social Engineer will to a certain extent 
adopt the attitude of “Socratic Ignorance” and recognize how little he knows, designing social 
institutions in a way that they can be improved continuously as flaws appear and are liable to be 
tackled.   
 “The task of the piecemeal engineer is to design social institutions, and to reconstruct 
and run those already in existence”.
48
 A social institution has, according to K. Popper, a broad 
sense which includes both public and private bodies. Hence, Piecemeal Social Engineering 
encompasses public as well as private social activities
49
. The piecemeal engineer realizes that 
“only a minority of social institutions are consciously designed while the vast majority have just 
‘grown’, as the undersigned results of human actions.”
50
 In regard to this, I believe one may 
assume that a certain institution has some kind of purpose that provides it the vitality to be 
maintained over time. If not, if it has no useful purpose, it will most likely disappear having no 
need to survive. Note that in this case, “purpose” is different from “function”. While a function 
would correspond to the establishment of a concrete end for a certain institution, the purpose is 
merely the use of such institution to serve any undertaking chosen by men. While a function has 
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an immutable character and is defined before the institution, the purpose emerges with the 
institution and is materialized by experience. A certain institution may have different purposes 
which are liable to be changed over time as men find new uses to a certain institution. Hence, 
the Piecemeal Social Engineer will look at social institutions from an ‘instrumental’ point of 
view. This means that “he will see them as means to certain ends, or as convertible to the 
service of certain ends; as machines rather than as organisms”
51
. Once institutions stop being 
useful in reaching those ends, they will naturally be extinguished and not preserved as static 
organisms continuously obliging men to fulfil certain immutable and predefined ends. 
 The definition of Piecemeal Social Engineering can be in sum characterized by a 
continuous and infinite
52
 process of institutional improvement, which is made little by little as 
flaws are identified in the system and are to be tackled. 
 
3.1. Piecemeal Technology: A Frame to Piecemeal Social Engineering 
 Beyond the classic definition of Piecemeal Social Engineering, K. Popper also 
distinguishes another concept which is equally relevant – “piecemeal technology”. It provides 
the structural framework from where Piecemeal Social Engineering can grow and is shaped as a 
particular mindset in approaching scientific theories and social policies. It is the environment 
found in Open Societies which allow the application of Piecemeal Social Engineering. 
 Piecemeal technology is then characterized by the combination of piecemeal tinkering 
and of critical analysis in order to provide practical developments in social and natural 
sciences
53
. According to K. Popper, “the social sciences have developed very largely through 
the criticism of proposals for social improvements or … through attempts to find out whether or 
not some particular economic or political action is likely to produce an expected, or desired, 
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. Hence, the piecemeal technology corresponds to this predisposition to engage into the 
dynamics of criticism of conjectures and their refutation, in order to understand the suitability of 
a certain scientific theory or policy to the practical context, through the observation of their 
practical results. If the results of a certain scientific theory, economic or political action are 
considered to be undesirable, according to the piecemeal technology they shall be refuted in 
order to extinguish and replace them by a new theory or policy, in a continuous process of 
adjustment. Piecemeal technology is then the predisposition found in the Popperian approach to 
the scientific method
55
 which advocates that it is through conjectures and refutations that we 
become closer to the truth, without however knowing with precision what is the truth, but being 
able to grasp what is not part of the truth – what is false – as the observation of the results given 
by experience reveals the flaws of a certain scientific theory or policy, and the underlying 
necessity to replace it by another in a trial and error basis
56
. 
 K. Popper maintains that “besides helping us in the fundamental task of selecting 
problems, the technological approach imposes a discipline on our speculative inclinations 
(which, especially in the field of sociology proper, are liable to lead us into the region of 
metaphysics); for it forces us to submit our theories to definite standards, such as standards of 
clarity and practical testability.”
57
 This passage suggests that the piecemeal technology is an 
attitude which allows us to ponder our alternatives in a critical manner and which is inserted 
into an environment of speculative discussions that are filtered by certain standards of 
Popperian testability. Piecemeal technology provides then the environment from where the 
emergence of hypothesis created by Piecemeal Social Engineering may emerge. It provides the 
critical mechanism allied to the acceptance of standards of testability which comprehend the 
ambiance that should be settled before Piecemeal Social Engineering can be brought off. The 
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harmonious interaction between piecemeal technology and Piecemeal Social Engineering can be 
found and constitute characterizing features of Open Societies. 
 
4. Contrasting Two Concepts of Social Engineering: Utopian & Piecemeal 
 In order to understand both concepts in a more comprehensive level, it is relevant to 
highlight the differences between Piecemeal and Utopian Social Engineering. 
 In contrast to the piecemeal method, the concept of Utopianism is exclusively 
concerned with the public sphere and aims “at remodelling ‘the whole society’ in accordance 
with a definite plan or blueprint”
58
 and at “extending ‘the power of the State … until the State 
becomes nearly identical with society’”
59
. Utopian engineers aim at controlling the inexorable 
laws of destiny (historical laws) by either arresting change or by trying to ‘foresee’ those laws 
and adjusting society to it. However, the Utopianist faces the problem of the uncertainty of the 
human factor, forcing him to try to control this human factor by institutional means. This 
represents the extension of his program that goes from the transformation of society, according 
to a blueprint, to the transformation of man who should follow his blueprint. Man should 
therefore be moulded to fit that new society. One could dwell on the moral implications of this 
aspect of Utopianism and also on its practicability, or rather impossibility, “for those who do 
not like living in it only admit thereby that they are not yet fit to live in it; that their ‘human 
impulses’ need further ‘organizing’. But without the possibility of tests, any claim that a 
‘scientific’ method is being employed evaporates. The holistic approach is incompatible with a 
truly scientific attitude”
60
 and is according to K. Popper, impossible in practical terms
61
. 
 But what is the main difference between Piecemeal Social Engineering and Utopian 
Social Engineering? Firstly, in order to explain this main difference, K. Popper maintains that 
both a constitutional reform within the public sphere and a series of piecemeal reforms inspired 
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by one general tendency fall under the scope of Piecemeal Social Engineering. While this 
statement may seem at first counter-intuitive, assuming that Piecemeal Social Engineering does 
not adopt any blueprint, the main difference then between the two concepts in practice “not so 
much in scale and scope as in caution and in preparedness for unavoidable surprises.”
62
 If 
“holists reject the Piecemeal Social Engineering as being too modest”
63
, their more ambitious 
blueprint-based agenda is as we have seen, impossible to be enforced in practice since “they 
always fall back on a somewhat haphazard and clumsy although ambitious and ruthless 
application of what is essentially a piecemeal method without its cautious and self-critical 
character.”
64
 Hence, Utopian Social Engineering is impossible to be applied in practice due to 
the large scale of unintended consequences the attempt of applying a blueprint to society as a 
whole creates. It forces the holistic engineer to a process of improvisation, of ‘unplanned 
planning’. The holistic engineer is therefore always struggling to tackle those unintended 
consequences that emerge from his own program without having the ability to indulge into a 
self-critical approach to the ‘surprises’ that appear over time as the piecemeal engineer has. He 
cannot make small changes on social institutions overtime as a means to tackle those mistakes 
since he has a rigid political agenda he has to follow – the utopian blueprint. Then, “while the 
piecemeal engineer can attack his problem with an open mind as to the scope of the reform, the 
holist cannot do this; for he has decided beforehand that a complete reconstruction is possible 
and necessary.”
65
 The holistic engineer violates then the principle of scientific method, while 
the piecemeal engineer does not. The ability to tackle unintended consequences is then the main 
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4.1. ‘Piecemeal Purpose’ and ‘Utopian Blueprint’: An Important Distinction 
 The distinction between the concepts defined as ‘piecemeal purpose’ and ‘utopian 
blueprint’ respectively based on K. Popper’s concepts of Piecemeal Social Engineering and 
Utopian Social Engineering is crucial in order to understand the differences inherent to the 
application of Utopian Social Engineering and Piecemeal Social Engineering as practical 
programmes. 
 If the ‘utopian blueprint’ is the core structural feature of a theoretical utopian society 
being the strategy behind the creation of the utopia, the ‘piecemeal purpose’ behaves as the 
theoretical structural basis for the set of several piecemeal adjustments that Piecemeal Social 
Engineering encompasses. In K. Popper’s words, what is here defined as ‘piecemeal purpose’ is 
not more than the “blueprints for single institutions”
66
 already mentioned above, or “what we 
actually were doing when we intervened with a certain aim in mind”
67
. It is the purpose that will 
motivate the piecemeal adjustment or adjustments. Taking this into account, it is relevant to 
pinpoint the main schisms between these two concepts to further clarify the distinction between 
Utopian and Piecemeal Social Engineering since they both are the gist of each of these two 
concepts focusing on its essential on the behaviour regarding the arrest of change, which is, 
according to K. Popper the fundamental distinction between Piecemeal Social Engineering and 
Utopianism
68
. This analysis is essential in order to understand how to apply Piecemeal Social 
Engineering as a practical programme to the account that it is necessary to understand where the 
‘piecemeal purpose’ ends and when the ‘utopian blueprint’ begins. 
 Firstly, let us consider a definition of Utopianism by K. Popper: 
“Any rational action [that] must have a certain aim. It is rational in the same degree as it 
pursues its aim consciously and consistently, and as it determines its means according to this 
end. To choose the end is therefore the first thing we have to do if we wish to act rationally; and 
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we must be careful to determine our real or ultimate ends, from which we must distinguish 
clearly those intermediate or partial ends which actually are only means, or steps on the way, to 
the ultimate end. If we neglect this distinction, then we must also neglect to ask whether these 
partial ends are likely to promote the ultimate end, and accordingly, we must fail to act 
rationally. These principles, if applied to the realm of political activity, demand that we must 
determine our ultimate political aim, or the Ideal State, before taking any practical action. 
Only when this ultimate aim is determined, in rough outline at least, only when we are in 
possession of something like a blueprint of the society at which we aim, only then can we begin 
to consider the best ways and means for its realization, and to draw up a plan for practical 
action. These are the necessary preliminaries of any practical political move that can be called 
rational, and especially of social engineering.”
69
 
 In this definition of Utopianism, it is possible to identify three
70
 distinguishing features 
of Utopian Blueprints. The expressions from the passage in bold respectively correspond to 
each of these three features: 
1. The first feature is the pseudo or dogmatic ‘rationality’ of the ‘utopian blueprint’. It is 
pursued in a systematic way over time and the gathering of resources previously 
collected are to be employed in the future in order to reach the ultimate end. From the 
idealization of the blueprint until its fulfilment, this methodology seeks total control 
over external factors which may lead to the deviation from the original strategy of the 
utopian blueprint. Also, the improvisation measures during the course of application of 
the utopian model should be minimal since it ought to be broadly planed in advance. 
2. The second distinguishing feature it is its characterization as the propeller to an 
“ultimate end”. The blueprint is therefore a long-term strategy, which will only fulfil 
itself at a single moment in the (unknown) future.  
3. The third characteristic of utopian blueprint presupposes that this concept is a 
theoretical one and therefore, that it is not only possible but rather compulsory that the 
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blueprint is defined before taking into account the environment to where it will be 
applied. The blueprint is static and the environment is malleable. This characteristic 
highlights again the idea of planning in advance. 
 In a nutshell, the Utopian Blueprint is a ‘theoretical long-term ultimate end which will 
only materialize in the future after a rational, systematic and total allocation of resources that 
should be foremost planned ahead, within the context of a malleable environment’. Considering 
this definition, let us now look upon the definition of ‘piecemeal purpose’: 
 K. Popper admits that “the piecemeal engineer will adopt the method of searching for, 
and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evil of society, rather than searching for, and 
fighting for, its greatest ultimate good.”
71
 Hence, the ‘purpose’ which backs Piecemeal Social 
Engineering is a “search” and “fight” against something
72
, implying movement and a sequence 
of actions. The Piecemeal approach does not set us an ultimate goal which guides our actions 
towards it, contrary to Utopianism. It is rather a journey, a constant fight against an issue which, 
according to the author, seems to be recurring and impossible to be completely annihilated in 
general terms and to all society. Hence, while the ‘utopian blueprint’ is the destination, the 
‘piecemeal purpose’ is a journey, since it would be absurd to believe that what is mean to be a 
constant ‘search’ can be achieved in a single step, in a single action, in a single plan. The 
concept of ‘piecemeal purpose’ therefore implies its replication with no sequence – meaning 
that the previous piecemeal action applied may not be related to the following one – within the 
context of a changing environment. The ‘piecemeal purpose’ tries not to control that 
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Chapter II - Applying Piecemeal Social Engineering as a Practical Programme: 
Considerations 
 
 After understanding the nature of the concepts of Utopian Social Engineering and of 
Piecemeal Social Engineering, this chapter will focus on important considerations upon the 
practical application of Piecemeal Social Engineering. It will be in some instances counter-
balanced with Utopian Social Engineering in order to provide a further understanding of the 
differences between the two attitudes and the strength of Utopianism when confronted with the 
Piecemeal method. 
 Although the aim of this chapter is not yet to provide an extensive criticism of the issues 
which may emerge upon the practical application of Piecemeal Social Engineering – which will 
be undertaken in the following chapter of this thesis – it will however present certain delicate 
considerations that are important to take into account before proceeding to the translation of 
Piecemeal Social Engineering into practical terms. 
 
1. Piecemeal Social Engineering: A Vague Programme 
 The analysis of how to apply Piecemeal Social Engineering as a practical programme is 
a hard task since K. Popper does not exactly specify any concrete methodology in order to 
translate this philosophical concept into a programme. By the application of a ‘practical 
programme’ one refers to the process of implementing Piecemeal Social Engineering in a given 
society with the aim of not only drawing new social institutions but also of providing 
maintenance to the existing ones. 
 In the following passages from “Æstheticism, Perfectionism, Utopianism”
73
, K. Popper 
presents the closest to a set of guiding principles in order to apply Piecemeal Social Engineering 
as a practical attitude. However, the author does not specify any concrete model in detail, many 
times describing procedures in a vague tone and without a systematic approach. These selected 
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passages are those which seem to describe more closely the application of Piecemeal Social 
Engineering into a practical programme. 
 Firstly, K. Popper claims that “the piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the 
method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, 
rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good.”
74
 Also, “the existence of 
social evils, that is to say, of social conditions under which many men are suffering, can be 
comparatively well established. Those who suffer can judge for themselves, and the others can 
hardly deny that they would not like to change places.”
75
 From this passage, we can understand 
that Piecemeal Social Engineering does not aim at idealizing the ‘good society’ but rather, at 
fighting against the “greatest and most urgent evils” that are a constituting part of such a 
society. We can also grasp that by “evils” or by “social evils”, K. Popper is referring to 
situations which cause men to ‘suffer’. We can therefore, associate ‘evil’ with the ‘state of 
suffering’ in order to understand the meaning of the concept of ‘evil’ is in K. Popper’s terms. 
 K. Popper also admits that “blueprints for piecemeal engineering are comparatively 
simple”
76
as opposed to utopian blueprints. “They are blueprints for single institutions, for 
health and unemployed insurance, for instance, or arbitration courts, or anti-depression 
budgeting, or educational reform”
77
 and not blueprints to remodel society as a whole as utopian 
blueprints are. In this statement, Popper appears to be defining the scope of the ‘piecemeal’ 
concept when it comes to the definition of the scale of intervention on a particular object. It 
seems that the scale of piecemeal intervention will depend on the scale of the evil. If the whole 
institution is democratically decided to be maintained since it still fulfils a desirable purpose, 
but is however contaminated by a certain evil, the scale of intervention would be larger than in a 
case where there is only a smaller evil in a particular feature of such institution. The piecemeal 
concept varies according to the scale of the evil but it never aims at remoulding the whole 
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society. While in the first case the extension of the concept of piecemeal encloses the 
improvement of a single social institution as a whole, making sense to design a blueprint for a 
single institution as K. Popper suggests
78
; in the second case the piecemeal concept refers to 
smaller reforms within social institutions, not enclosing the whole institution but rather certain 
particular aspects of such institution.  
 Secondly, Popper claims that “if it is easier to reach a reasonable agreement about 
existing evils and the means of combating them … then there is also more hope that by using the 
piecemeal method we may get over the very greatest practical difficulty of all reasonable 
political reform, namely, the use of reason, instead of passion and violence, in executing the 
programme.”
79
 With this, K. Popper advocates the use of reason as a fundamental ingredient to 
operate under Piecemeal Social Engineering as well as the necessity to engage into public 
discussion in order to reach “a reasonable compromise and therefore of achieving the 
improvement by democratic methods.”
80
 K. Popper maintains that politics should then “begin to 
look out for their mistakes instead of trying to explain them away and to prove that they have 
always been right.”
81
 Hence, we may conclude that the practical application of Piecemeal Social 
Engineering encloses the application of the Popperian scientific method to politics, based on 
trial and error and one the “readiness to learn from mistakes”
82
.  
 These selected passages allow us to conclude that when applied in a certain society as a 
practical programme, Piecemeal Social Engineering should promote the debate of ideas in a 
rational way in order to reach a “reasonable agreement” about the “existing evils” of such 
society and “the means of combating them”. By denying the idealization of what is ‘good’, of 
how the ideal society should be designed, Piecemeal Social Engineering promotes instead the 
fight against the “most urgent evils” in that society. Once those evils are consensually agreed 
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upon as harmful, the “means of combating them” are also to be discussed “by democratic 
methods” in order to reach another “reasonable compromise” before one proceeds to fight them. 
Then, after both the “evils” and the “means of combating them” are consensually decided, 
improvements should be carried out in order to “fight” those evils. These improvements are 
undertaken based on the Popperian approach to the scientific method, by trial and error, by 
proposing conjectures and proceeding to their refutation in a continuous basis, allowing us to 
“reform institutions little by little, until we have more experience in social engineering”
83
. 
 In Piecemeal versus Utopian Engineering
84
, K. Popper highlights some of the points 
covered above. However, the author does not go into further detail when specifying the 
methodology for applying Piecemeal Social Engineering. In that section of The Poverty of 
Historicism (1957) the author focuses more in how the piecemeal social engineer looks upon 
social institutions
85
, why he is more inclined to Piecemeal Social Engineering than to 
Utopianism
86
 and how the Piecemeal Social Engineering concept differs from Utopianism
87
. 
This work covers a more philosophical reflection about Piecemeal Social Engineering as a 
single concept and as a force opposed to Utopianism, than a methodological approach to apply a 
Piecemeal Social Engineering programme, not being for this reason so relevant for our analysis. 
 Finally, it is important to consider that the fact that the K. Popper does not give us a 
defined guideline in order to apply Piecemeal Social Engineering in practice may be intentional. 
If the author created a guideline for the practical application of this attitude, he would indeed be 
providing a static blueprint of how the Piecemeal method should be applied in practice, 
restricting to a certain extent the possibility to apply it in accordance to its suitability to the 
preferences of the individuals in a given society and the possibility to alter it by trial and error. 
He would most likely be falling into the Utopianist realm. 
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2. Is Piecemeal Social Engineering necessarily Framed within the Open Society? 
 In order to analyse how the concept of Piecemeal Social Engineering could be translated 
into a practical attitude, it is relevant to question whether or not a context of Open Society is a 
prerequisite to the application of Piecemeal Social Engineering.  
 Although there is no explicit claim that Piecemeal Social Engineering demands a 
context of Open Society, K. Popper argues that “we can never return to the alleged innocence 
and beauty of the closed society”
88
 as Plato’s social theory suggested, based on the idea that the 
arrest of all political change would bring happiness
89
. K. Popper adds that “once we begin to 
rely upon our reason, and to use our powers of criticism, once we feel the call of personal 
responsibilities, and with it, the responsibility of helping to advance knowledge, we cannot 
return to a stage of implicit submission to tribal magic. For those who have eaten of the tree of 
knowledge, paradise is lost.”
90
 These statements seem to imply that from the moment reason 
and criticism start being used, namely in answering the call of personal responsibilities and in 
the advance of knowledge, one does not encounter himself in a Closed Society any longer since 
reason and openness to criticism are characteristics of an Open Society only, as well as the 
possibility to have different ways of life within a single society. The author adds that once one 
has drifted away from the Closed Society, it is not possible to go back.  
 As we have seen in the previous section, Piecemeal Social Engineering is necessarily 
founded in reason and in the critical debate of ideas that would lead to a reasonable compromise 
in order to act
91
. This concept also defends the scientific method applied to the realm of ideas in 
a trial and error basis
92
, promoting to this extent the ‘advance of knowledge’. This type of social 
engineering would hardly have space to be applied to its full potential in a Closed Society, 
where reason and criticism are replaced by the ‘submission to tribal magic’. Logically, a Closed 
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Society would probably not have the capacity to adopt Piecemeal Social Engineering since there 
would not have a criticism prone environment. 
 The consideration that an Open Society is indeed a pre-requisite for the application of 
Piecemeal Social Engineering raises a relevant question – how open should a society be in order 
to embrace Piecemeal Social Engineering successfully. If a fully opened society would be well 
prepared to embrace the application of Piecemeal Social Engineering, then, in which cases and 
(if in any at all) could an ‘embryonic’ Open Society adopt Piecemeal Social Engineering 
effectively. This is a very difficult question which answer goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
It is however a question of extreme importance, namely in order to understand the degree of 
consolidation that an Open Society should have in order to make the use of Piecemeal Social 
Engineering achievable. 
 
3. The Link between Piecemeal Social Engineering and Liberal Democracy 
 Liberal democratic institutions do not aim at following a blueprint for the whole society. 
Rather, they aim at solving issues which are consensually considered to be harmful in a similar 
way Piecemeal Social Engineering does. Bertrand Russell called to K. Popper’s The Open 
Society and Its Enemies (1945) a “vigorous and profound defence of democracy”
93
 due to this 
parallelism between K. Popper’s defence of the democratic tackling of consensual evils instead 
of the pursuit for a higher ideal of good and happiness in the shape of a blueprint. One could 
however argue that it is not absolutely true that liberal democracies strictly follow in practice 
this approach of solely tackling issues in a negative sense, or in other words, of using negative 
utilitarianism. Rather, liberal democracies adopt an imperfect attitude of Piecemeal Social 
Engineering since they also do try sometimes to reach consensus in order to formulate social 
policies for existing issues in a positive sense. The decision in those cases is not based on what 
evil to eradicate but rather on whether a certain good is desirable or not, and whether it should 
be implemented. It is the imperfect Popperian scientific method applied to the realm of politics, 
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embedded in the human inability to always formulate the problems to be solved and decided 
upon in a negative sense. 
 It is also not absolutely true that liberal democracies always decide with an utilitarian 
mindset, basing all choices in tackling ‘the greatest’ evil, in negative utilitarianism, or of 
choosing ‘the larger’ good, in case of an imperfect application of Piecemeal Social Engineering. 
Nevertheless, this section does not aim at condemning these small considerations, being 
however interesting to take them into account. One may argue that liberal democracy is the 























Chapter III – Challenges Upon the Application of Piecemeal Social Engineering in a 
Practical Context 
 
 This chapter constitutes the most crucial part of our analysis concerning the practical 
application of Piecemeal Social Engineering. It intends to explore some critical issues faced by 
this attitude upon its translation into an effective programme. The aim of this chapter is to raise 
awareness to the obstacles that Piecemeal Social Engineering may face when translated into a 
practical programme in order to encourage the search for solutions and the weighing of the risks 
associated with its practical application. 
 It is hard, or even impossible, to list all the obstacles which may result from the 
application of this attitude. The different contexts of its application in various societies 
characterized by a wide range of distinctive features and by singular social-cultural-economic 
backgrounds would necessarily differentiate the way Piecemeal Social Engineering would result 
in practice. This is true due to the vague conception of this attitude and to the lack of a pre-
established programme to guide its practical application, as it was explored in the previous 
chapter. The degree of openness of a certain Open Society and the notions of what is ‘good’ and 
‘evil’, are for instance factors which could impact the personality of the outcome of the 
application of Piecemeal Social Engineering in a particular context. Considering this, the effort 
of enouncing all the issues which could result from this procedure is most likely an 
impracticable effort since it would require a beyond human reasoning capability. 
 Considering this limitation, the three issues explored in this chapter are broad enough to 
be transversal to all the variants of Piecemeal Social Engineering due to their comprehensive 
nature, not substantially dependent on the societal context where it is applied. 
 
1. 1st Issue: Immediate and Permanent Adjustments 
 The first issue considered to be relevant upon the application of Piecemeal Social 
Engineering as a practical attitude has to do with the time gap between the emergence of a 
problem to be solved by piecemeal methods and the actual enforcement of the adjustment. 
33 
 
 Between the identification of a certain ‘evil’ in society which is considered harmful 
enough in order to be tackled using Piecemeal Social Engineering and the actual action of 
correcting the issue, there is a ‘dead’ time gap where simply no action is taken into course. It is 
important to note that it is being considered in this case that the time lapse between the 
application of a corrective policy and the outcome effect is null. In practice this is hardly true as 
Popper argues, maintaining that “hardly any social action ever produces precisely the result 
expected”
94
 which would raise another problem: there is another gap between the expectation of 
the application of a certain piecemeal policy and its result in reality. Nevertheless, this question 
is outside the scope of this thesis, not only due to its complexity but primarily because it is not a 
direct problem resulting from the application of Piecemeal Social Engineering as a 
methodology.  
 Until now, this issue is not exclusive to the Popperian piecemeal approach. It is a 
problem found in the application of nearly every policy to a certain problem in a given society. 
However, what makes this problem relevant to this particular methodology is the fact that 
without immediate adjustments, the problem at stake may worsen and gain larger proportions if 
not solved in the adequate time frame. The longer the time gap between the need to act and the 
action itself, the worse the problem will tend to get. Hence, what started off as the fight for 
smaller “concrete evils”
95
 will tend to become a problem with a denser complexity which may 
require a wider scale of intervention. 
 This raises a huge problem for K. Popper since interventionism is extremely dangerous 
for the protection of freedom. K. Popper raises this question taking the particular case of 
economic interventionism into account, claiming that “intervention, even the piecemeal 
methods advocated here, will tend to increase the power of the state. Interventionism is 
therefore extremely dangerous. This is not a decisive argument against it; state power must 
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always remain a dangerous though necessary evil.”
96
 In this statement K. Popper is referring to 
what he called the ‘paradox of state planning’: “if we plan too much, if we give too much power 
to the state, then freedom will be lost, and that will be the end of planning.”
97
  
 The impossibility to make piecemeal adjustments to social issues in the adequate time 
frame will increase the scale of the issue and require more intervention which will put freedom 
at stake. In 1948, M. Oakeshott wrote a letter to K. Popper expressing concern for these 
consequences: “no problem in politics should be allowed to get out of proportion & to exclude 
the real business of politics – which is to keep the society as a whole, in all its arrangements, 
coherent and stable as well as progressive.”
98
 It is not farfetched to believe that in many cases, 
perhaps in most cases, it is difficult to make adjustments perfectly coordinated with necessities, 
due to the reasons mentioned above. 
 This problem has another dimension related to the necessity to engage into ‘permanent 
adjustments’ in order to solve “concrete evils”
99
 in regard to a certain political issue. These 
permanent adjustments are in accordance with the nature of the process of Piecemeal Social 
Engineering, which as inspired by the Popperian scientific method, tries to compel “us to 
submit our theories to definite standards, such as standards of clarity and practical 
testability”
100
. However, the problem lays in the argument that “no problem in politics is ever 
solved permanently”
101
, that there is no such as thing as a closure to political problems. K. 
Popper agrees with this point claiming that “I fully agree … that no problem is solved 
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permanently” and adds that “I should even put it this way: no problem in politics can be solved 
without creating a new one.”
102
 
 The fact that no political problem can be solved permanently and that it might 
eventually create a new one if solved is not alone a substantial criticism to Piecemeal Social 
Engineering. It only means that in order to find solutions to the new problems and to continually 
adjust the resolution to permanent issues, the trial and error process will have to become more 
agile to come up with new rational and consensual solutions. What some authors claim is that 
there is “common to markets and democracy, a trial-and-error ability to exit from bad 
situations without needing to figure out what has gone wrong. But such experimentation takes 
so long in politics that except when it is used to get rid of a monstrous tyrant, it must be 
supplemented by non-reactive, explicit human reasoning about what has gone wrong if it is 
expected to satisfy the ambitions of the social democrat.”
103
 The concern expressed in this 
statement has to do with the long time period that goes between the application of a corrective 
policy to a problem by trial and error and the actual appearance of a result from such process. If 
many piecemeal adjustments are necessary in order to correct a certain issue, the process will 
require a substantial time frame that will lead again to the increase of the scale of that problem 
and to certain collateral effects resulting from the failed application of previous piecemeal 
adjustments, before having reached a policy solution. 
 
2. 2nd Issue: Arbitrariness 
 Some authors
104
 may argue that this second issue is only found, or found with more 
strength, in the Continental Tradition than in the Anglo-Saxon one. This problem regarding the 
practical application of Piecemeal Social Engineering concerns the lack of long-term planning 
in the application of a Piecemeal attitude. The aggregation of the various piecemeal purposes do 
not necessarily conduct to the realization of any specific predetermined target, whereas, in the 
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fulfilment of a utopian blueprint, all efforts and resources are designated to the reaching of a 
single goal. Synergies, scale economies and unification of efforts become weaker in the pursuit 
of various piecemeal purposes rather than in the pursuit of a utopian blueprint. 
 K. Popper stand against the arbitrariness of the decisions of rulers, suggesting the 
necessity to “guard persons against their arbitrariness”
105
 through a mechanism of checks and 
balances. However, this arbitrariness is slightly different from the one mentioned above. This 
one regards the unpredictability of human behaviour, in this case reflected in the choices of 
rulers in power, and alerts that “while the political question of the day may demand a personal 
solution, all long-term policy—and especially all democratic long-term policy—must be 
conceived in terms of impersonal institutions.”
106
 
 The arbitrariness as an obstacle to the practical implementation of Piecemeal Social 
Engineering is then more related to the first notion of arbitrariness than to the one presented by 
K. Popper. It expresses the concern that in a single society there can coexist piecemeal purposes 
in favour
107
 and against the same evil to eradicate. Will that not produce neutral results or a 
struggle within a struggle? This is particularly sound in the difficulty to reach long-term goals 
which need some degree of consistency, namely when it comes to economic policies. In this 
case, the coexistence of contrary policies would undermine the measures already taken into 
course. The interruption of a certain policy aimed at the long-term and its substitution by 
another policy, resulting for example from a change of the ruling party with a different solution 
to that single issue, would provoke the delay or the impossibility of fighting the evil at stake, 
and the waste of resources. 
 Of course one has to note that Piecemeal Social Engineering does not aim at full 
efficiency in the application of resources in a society, preferring multiplicity of purposes to the 
union of forces in order to achieve a single goal. It should be however noted that in the case of 
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some long-term policies, the interference of contradictory actions could strongly undermine 
their realization. 
 
3. 3rd Issue: The Motivation Problem in Fighting “Concrete Evils”108 
 This section aims at analysing a third issue liable to occur upon the implementation of 
policies based on Piecemeal Social Engineering which is the most dangerous of the three. It is 
related to the incentives paradigm intrinsic to the expression of this attitude in a practical 
fashion. More specifically, it will focus on the subject of the fight against “concrete evils” 
epitomized by this method, highlighting the implications resulting from its concrete application 
in a certain society. 
 
3.1.  The Strength of the Utopian Blueprint 
 The concept of Utopian Engineering by K. Popper was previously introduced in this 
thesis as the “attempt to realize an ideal state, using a blueprint of society as a whole, … which 
demands a strong centralized rule of a few, and which therefore is likely to lead to a 
dictatorship”
109
. K. Popper emphatically stresses that “the Utopian method must lead to a 
dangerous dogmatic attachment to a blueprint for which countless sacrifices have been 
made”
110
, characterizing the Utopian method as the most dangerous approach towards politics. 
Hence K. Popper not only recognizes, but above all aims at exposing the power of Utopianism 
in influencing political thought, present ever since Plato’s time being prominent during the 
struggle against the new ideals of Pericles and the Great Generation of Athenian democrats. 
Taking these considerations into account, allied with the more in-depth description of 
Utopianism provided in the first chapter of this thesis, it is possible to understand the power and 
high impact of Utopian Engineering to which K. Popper dedicates plenty of attention in both of 
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his most relevant political works The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) and The Poverty of 
Historicism (1957), with the aim of extensively dismantling this concept in order to present a 
comparably strong criticism of it
111
. This alternative to Utopianism
112
 and to the existence of an 
idealistic utopian blueprint is, as we have previously analysed, the Piecemeal Social 
Engineering attitude which aims at fighting concrete evils in a society. 
 However, upon the application of this attitude, a very relevant question needs to be 
raised: is it really true that when applied in a practical framework, the strength of the ‘piecemeal 
purpose’, described with more detail in the first chapter of this thesis as the purpose that will 
motivate the piecemeal adjustment or adjustments equates the power of ‘utopian blueprint’? 
Can we say that the idealism brought by the utopia which has fostered so many passions and 




 evils in a 
society? These questions constitute obstacles to the application of Piecemeal Social Engineering 
as a practical attitude, for the suspicion that the utopian blueprint may present itself as a stronger 
motivator to create social policies than a piecemeal purpose, may lead to the fracture of a 
society employing the Piecemeal method and the resurgence of Utopianism due to its power of 
prevalence. 
 
3.2.  The Prevalence of Utopian Blueprints over Piecemeal Adjustments in Times of Crisis 
in Liberal Democracy 
 “Because the tragedy of the world's poorest peoples is so heartbreaking, an 
appropriately large response is more appealing in development economics than in more 
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emotionally neutral areas like, say, the efficiency of the stock market … because it seems to 
promise a quick end to the tragedy.”
115
 
 This citation portraits the gist of the tendency towards Utopianism. Naturally, a big 
tragedy seems to call for a proportionally big solution. Following this line of thought, it makes 
sense to think of an utopian blueprint to remodel the whole society in times of great crisis, in 
order to re-establish a new and more desirable order, free from the evil brought by the ancient 
one. It is not the case that Utopianism is always badly intentioned. Actually, it may emerge from 
the “dreams of a beautiful world”
116
, from “the best intentions of making heaven on earth”
117
 
and from the “fundamental benevolence”
118
 of the blueprint’s designer. K. Popper confirmed 
that “the strength of both the old and the new totalitarian movements rested on the fact that they 
attempted to answer a very real need, however badly conceived this attempt may have been”.
119
 
 Before proceeding with this argument regarding the prevalence of the Utopian approach 
over the Piecemeal one in times of crisis, it is relevant to remind ourselves of a crucial point 
which we have already looked upon in the previous chapter of this thesis and which is most 
relevant to this analysis. The point is that it is easy to establish a link between liberal democracy 
and Piecemeal Social Engineering.  
 Many times during the course of the History of our Humanity, in times of turmoil, 
radical movements have materialized over apathetic liberal democracies, based on this 
Utopianist creed of ‘canvas cleaning’
120
 in order to establish a new order built upon the promise 
of a better future. “In 1933, the Soviet and Nazi governments shared the appearance of a 
capacity to respond to the world economic collapse. Both radiated dynamism at a time when 
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liberal democracy seemed unable to rescue people from poverty. ... The Nazis and Soviets both 
had a powerful story about who was to blame for the Great Depression ... and authentically 
radical approaches to political economy.”
121
 It is extremely important to notice how these two 
authoritarian creeds based in two different utopian blueprints were both capable of presenting 
themselves as more appealing alternatives to a liberal democracy. It had not necessarily have to 
do with the essence of the blueprint, of its promise, of its aim, but rather to the fact that both the 
Soviet and the Nazi utopian blueprints “appealed to the necessity of a single and vigorous will 
that was liable to replace the alleged debility of parliamentary politics and the alleged 
blindness of market economies.”
122
 The allure of the utopian ideal, the promise of a solid 
blueprint to remodel society as a whole, able to eradicate evil with a more aggressive 
impetuous, was more enticing than the mere fight against concrete evils in a piecemeal approach 
until the calamities were neutralized.  
 This tendency to embrace authoritarianism instead of a Piecemeal approach based on 
the gradual elimination of evil in a crisis situation, has essentially two sources. The first one, 
already mentioned, has to do with the human natural tendency to approach a big evil with a big 
solution. The bigger the problem, the bigger the remedy. The consequence of this attitude is a 
blind faith in an utopian ideal that promises the absolute eradication of all the evil and the 
establishment of a better order dictated by an idealized blueprint. As K. Popper suggested, this 
type of belief will only lead to violence due to the impossibility to reach the utopian goal. 
 The second source has to do with the nostalgia for the tribal society. Upon the 
breakdown of the tribal society “the strain of civilization” began “to be felt”
123
, deeply 
impacting the way society was organized and perceived itself. If in a tribal society the individual 
has no space to reason and to “doubt how he ought to act”
124
, the disintegration of the tribal 
society and the subsequent progression to an open society led the individual to become 
                                                          
121
 SNYDER, T. (2010). Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin. New York: Basic Books. [17] 
122
 Free translation from ESPADA, J. C. (2014). Portugal, a Europa e o Atl ntico. [Portugal, Europe and 
the Atlantic]. [28] 
123
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [189] 
124
 POPPER, K., (1945). The open society and its enemies vol. I. 2005 ed. Oxfordshire: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd. [185] 
41 
 
autonomous in terms of reasoning, of acting and deciding. This autonomy and the bearing of 
this strain is, according to K. Popper, “the price to be paid for every increase in knowledge, in 
reasonableness, in cooperation and in mutual help, and consequently in our chances of 
survival, and in the size of the population. It is the price we have to pay for being human.”
125
 
However, this strain is felt more intensely “in times of social change”
126
. K. Popper also 
suggested that it “seems as if historicist ideas easily become prominent in times of great social 
change.”
127
 Even though K. Popper is referring to Historicism, a similar inference can be made 
to Utopianism, since Utopianism is as we have seen not more than an alternative to Historicism, 
based on the same promptness to renounce to this autonomy of reasoning and to the 
accountability for one’s self-ruling decisions. 
 The examples of the Soviet and Nazi authoritarian regimes are generally considered to 
be the strongest utopias History has record of. This is true considering the strength of their 
“spell”
128
, their power of attraction and the brutal consequences of the attempt to their 
implementation. However, other situations of great crises nurtured the emergence of ideas of 
this sort, both historicist and utopian, namely when the “Greek tribal life broke up, as well as 
when that of the Jews was shattered by the impact of the Babylonian conquest.”
129
 In support of 
the emergence of a nostalgia for the tribal society in times of turmoil, K. Popper adds that 
“there can be little doubt, I believe, that Heraclitus’ philosophy is an expression of a feeling of 
drift; a feeling which seems to be a typical reaction to the dissolution of the ancient tribal forms 
of social life. In modern Europe, historicist ideas were revived during the industrial revolution, 
and especially through the impact of the political revolutions in America and France.”
130
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 After these considerations, it is important to highlight the conclusion that the utopian
131
 
danger presents itself as more powerful during a situation of crisis, in times when democratic 
institutions are weaker. Let us notice however that this weakening of democratic institutions 
does not necessarily start along with the emergence of a sudden evil prone to create chaos. The 
factors responsible for diluting the vigour of democratic institutions may be silent and 
antecedent to the pinnacle of a crisis situation, being however furtive enough to the decrease of 
the trust in liberal democracy. Once democratic institutions are fragile, their predisposition to 
trigger a sound crisis situation and prepare ground for Utopianism sharply increase. 
 
3.3.  Is an Ideal Vital in the Piecemeal Society? 
 What we have been analysing up to now is the tendency to rely more in utopian 
blueprints rather than in piecemeal purposes in situations where democratic institutions are 
fragile and going through a concrete or eminent social crisis. We have also seen that this 
happens mainly due to the natural impulse to apply big remedies to big problems, and as a result 
of the increase in the strain that the responsibility and accountability of liberal democracy puts 
in individuals in times of turmoil, making them yearn for a return to the tribal society. 
 The idealistic utopian blueprint seems then to have a guiding strength that appeals more 
than a piecemeal purpose free from an idealized aim towards a utopia. If this is so, it is relevant 
to ask where does the motivation to fight for liberal democracy comes from, to strive for the 
application of the Piecemeal method particularly in times of great crisis instead of succumbing 
to the dangerous appeal of Utopianism. 
 We have concluded in the first chapter of this thesis that while the aim of Piecemeal 
Social Engineering is the continuous fight against concrete and immediate evils, the aim of 
Utopian Social Engineering is establishing a blueprint for the whole society based on a single 
higher ideal. But is the motivation to fight against a smaller and concrete evil the same as 
fighting for a large and luminous ideal? Previously in this section, we have observed that in 
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times of turmoil, the motivation to fight for concrete evils until society is restored to a situation 
which is again desirable, is weaker than that for fighting for an all-promising utopian blueprint. 
Considering this extremely important point, it is very relevant to enquire how one could 
increase the motivation to fight for concrete evils, to an extent that this motivation becomes as 
great as that provided by an utopian blueprint. What can be done so that Piecemeal Social 
Engineering is preferred to Utopianism, even in times of great danger where social damage 
seems irremediable?   
 The appeal to fight for a ‘positive’ ideal in a liberal democracy, in a society applying 
Piecemeal Social Engineering seems to be a great challenge to the application of this attitude in 
a practical context, perhaps the greatest of all. Although this question remains unsolved, the last 




















Chapter IV – Unveiling the Path to Solutions in Contemporary Open Societies 
 
1. The Importance of Preserving the Open Society 
 As analysed in the previous chapter of this thesis, the adoption of the Piecemeal method 
of social engineering is prone to originate negative consequences upon its practical application. 
The challenges which constitute a barrier to the well-functioning of the Piecemeal approach 
may endanger liberal democracy, as the retraction in the use of this approach will necessarily 
force the adoption of other types of social engineering. 
 If the Piecemeal method is based on “democracy and the market economy”
132
, being 
constituted by “fine mechanisms to avoid the entrenchment of errors”
133
 also allowing the 
possibility to “make adjustments in the light of discussion and experience”
134
, its dereliction 
will necessarily debilitate the Open Society. The importance to preserve the integrity of the 
Open Society is paramount, since it constitutes the foundation from where Piecemeal Social 
Engineering can flourish. A fragile Open Society is more susceptible to become threatened by 
the strong and dangerously appealing forces of Utopianism, which is according to K. Popper
135
, 
the single alternative to Piecemeal Social Engineering. The appeal of Utopianism lays in the 
illusion of the rather impossible quest to go back to the shelter of the Closed Society in a natural 
and non-violent manner, in times where rationality and democratic values are shaken by 
uncertainty. 
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 R. Dahrendorf (1997) depicted this phenomenon while maintaining that democracy and 
the market economy “do not offer people a home”
136
, leaving “important human needs … 
unsatisfied by the institutions of the open society.”
137
 Hence, “people look around elsewhere; 
and if the going gets rough – elections disappoint, convertibility and privatization do not bring 
immediate prosperity – people want satisfaction quickly and comprehensively”
138
. R. 
Dahrendorf (1997) denominated this circumstance as “the hour of false gods”
139
 where 
“worldly spokesmen, the new dictators”
140
 would provide new alternatives to those provided by 
the Open Society and the piecemeal method, in a context where democratic institutions are 
perceived as rotten. These alternatives are of totalitarian character, and prepare the ground for 
the emergence of Utopianism. 
 There are other authors, such as G. P. Grant (1954), who also identified this tendency to 
look for alternatives other than Piecemeal Social Engineering, in times when liberal democracy 
presents itself as stale. This author argues that “when the weaknesses of our tradition have been 
so radically exposed, men not only revolt against its inconsistencies, but against much of its 
truth as well. Having lost one ground of practical certainty, they look desperately around for 
another.”
141
 This sentence highlights the revolt against an entrenched tradition due to the 
perception of its vulnerabilities, and the consequent search for a practical and quicker 
alternative. This may very well portray the revolt against the Tradition of Liberty and the search 
for other alternatives. However, if we are to abandon liberty, if we are to abandon democracy in 
the Open Society and the Piecemeal approach to public policy, we are then likely to walk into 
the domains of totalitarianism, dangerously fuelled by the utopian dream. 
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 The importance in trying to lessen the negative consequences which may derive from 
the practical application of the Piecemeal method is then of extreme urgency. As forewarned by 





2. Approaches to Minimize Piecemeal Social Engineering’s Negative Impact 
 Considering the importance of preserving the Open Society, it is then fundamental to 
have a well operating Piecemeal mechanism, since this is the preferred social engineering 
method in the Open Society, being the only rational
143
 one according to K. Popper. It was 
previously analysed that there are three major general issues regarding the practical application 
of Piecemeal Social Engineering as a public policy mechanism: adjustment issues, arbitrariness 
issues and the lack of motivation problem. This section will aim at trying to understand how a 
resolution to these negative consequences could be implemented and the extent to which these 
problems are a threat to the Open Society, to liberal democracy and to freedom.  
 In order to analyse the resolution of these issues it is important to distinguish structural 
problems from non-structural problems. The former are intrinsic to the Piecemeal attitude, not 
liable to be completely extinguished, only reduced upon the increase of the efficiency in the use 
of this method. They are structural, part of the constituent characteristics of this approach. For 
this reason, they are not necessarily a threat to liberal democracy and to the Open Society. We 
can say they are part of them. On the other hand, the latter non-structural issues are not intrinsic 
to the Piecemeal method of social engineering. They are external to this approach and not liable 
to be reduced upon an increase of the efficiency of this system. The origin of this problem has 
not to do with an operational failure of the system but rather with how the external factors 
embrace this system. It is an outside-in problem. The following sections will analyse how these 
two types of issues can be tackled. 
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2.1.  Structural Issues 
 As mentioned, structural issues are part of the system, are constituent parts of the 
Piecemeal approach and therefore natural to the Open Society. Because they are structural, it is 
not possible to remove them completely. It is however possible to reduce them by increasing the 
efficiency of this attitude and by adapting it better to the type of society at stake. Structural 
problems of the Piecemeal approach are materialized as intrinsic operational problems of 
contemporary liberal democracies such as bureaucracy, large time-frames in decision making, 
indecision, poor allocation of resources, lack of information, inefficiency of agents such as 
corruption, bribery or job unsuitability, within others.  
 It is important to note however, that although it is unlikely that these problems alone 
may seriously put freedom and liberal democracy in danger, an attitude of inaction towards 
these problems may bolster the internal conflict within the Open Society and fuel the conflicts 
already existing within it which may not necessarily be structural. This attitude of inaction 
should be avoided as it can give space for revolt to materialize and incite other deeper and more 
dangerous type of problems. 
 From the issues analysed in the previous chapter of this thesis, two of them are 
considered to be structural: the ‘Immediate and Permanent Adjustments’ and the ‘Arbitrariness’.  
 In regard to the issue of ‘Immediate and Permanent Adjustments’, it mostly has to do 
with inefficiencies. The ‘dead’ time gap between the identification of a social issue and the 
action towards its resolution may happen for several reasons: the issue takes a significant 
amount of time to be analysed due to its complexity, there is difficulty in reaching “a 
reasonable compromise” in order to achieve “the improvement by democratic methods”
144
 
concerning the solution to be applied, there is bureaucratic impossibility to act faster, the 
resources to apply the solution consensually agreed upon are lacking, there is not sufficient 
information in order to act, within others. 
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 All these inefficiencies are however suitable to be confronted with measures such as 
programs to reduce bureaucracy, policies to fight corruption in order to have a better allocation 
of resources and a more democratic decision making, a better education system which is likely 
to increase the quality of democratic proposals and hence of democratic decisions, within many 
others. As we have seen, this issue only becomes truly harmful if, in the one hand, the 
discontentment provoked by this issue increases the already entrenched tension in democracy 
and in the Open Society resulting into the weakening of democratic institutions and the opening 
of the path towards extremism and Utopianism. On the other hand, and as we have already 
considered in the previous chapter, this issue may constitute an obstacle to the application of the 
Piecemeal method and of the maintenance of freedom if the time-frame between the 
identification of an ‘evil’ and the action in order to tackle it is so great that a ‘concrete evil’ 
becomes a larger evil. The consequence of this is a deeply undesirable, according to K. 
Popper
145
, raise to which the amount of intervention is needed to solve such issue.  
 The other issue included in this category, the problem of ‘Arbitrariness’ has not so 
much to do with inefficiencies of the Piecemeal method in general terms, but rather with the 
view upon the nature of formulation of policies. The depth of this problem varies in different 
societies, although it is generally felt by all of them namely in the specific case of long-term 
economic policies. R. Dahrendorf takes a stand on this issue arguing that “the most important 
point to remember is that there is no such thing as a seamless economic policy, important 
though it is to have one reformer on board who has a clear vision and the nerve to pursue it 
against many odds.”
146
 In this case, an agenda is usually seen as necessary in order to reach a 
long-term economic goal such as the case of austerity. 
 As we have seen in the previous chapter, this is a problem more present in Continental 
traditions rather than in Anglo-Saxon ones. While the former tend to “perceive democratic 
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politics as a means to achieving a purpose”
147
, in the latter “democracy is less a means to an 
end than an ethos and a way of life”
148
. J. C. Espada viewed this phenomenon with particular 
clarity, stating that “among English-speaking peoples … democracy will sometimes go in one 
direction, while at other times it will head toward a different and maybe even opposite point of 
the compass.”
149
 Considering this, the author adds that “no external substantive purpose, 
therefore, can be identified with democracy. Different, often opposing, purposes enter into the 




 Taking these considerations into account, one cannot say that this problem is likely to 
seriously undermine the future of the Open Society since it is not felt in every society – being 
more present in those embracing the Continental tradition – and is in fact the price to pay for 
more freedom instead of more efficiency in social engineering. Hence, “we should avoid 





2.2.  Non-Structural Issues 
 The regarded ‘Motivation Problem’ is a non-structural issue. It is a distinct problem 
from the natural dynamics of the Open Society, generated outside its innate mechanism and 
being for this reason more dangerous than the structural issues which are to a certain extent, 
constituting parts of the Piecemeal system. Hence, the non-structural issues are not necessarily 
‘negative externalities’ of the application of Piecemeal Social Engineering, but an external body 
which collides with the Piecemeal approach. Finding a solution to this issue is therefore critical 
in order to preserve democratic institutions, freedom, and the prosperity of the Open Society. 
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 As seen in the explanation of the ‘Motivation Problem’ in the previous chapter, 
Utopianism and its idealistic blueprints tend to present themselves as stronger sources of 
motivation in order to mobilize spirits and resources to the creation of new social policies than 
the fight against concrete evils which Piecemeal Social Engineering proposes. Taking this into 
account, K. Popper warned that some authors “argue that democracy, in order to fight 
totalitarianism, is forced to copy its methods and thus to become totalitarian itself.”
152
  
 Curiously, even some liberal authors have indeed proposed a mechanism such as a 
‘liberal utopia’. "It is perhaps ironic that in CAR
153
, the book Popper dedicated to Hayek, he 
denied that there could be a liberal utopia, whereas in Studies in Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics (hereafter PPE), dedicated to Popper, Hayek expressed the need for a liberal 
utopian vision."
154
 In defence of a liberal utopia, to which K. Popper was absolutely against, F. 
Hayek argued that “what we lack is a liberal Utopia, a program which seems neither a mere 
defence of things as they are nor a diluted kind of socialism [...] We need intellectual leaders 
who are willing to fight for an ideal, however small may be the prospects of its early realisation. 
They must be men who are willing to stick to principles and to fight for their full realisation”
155
. 
 If the idealistic dimension of Utopianism is portrayed by a blueprint, the idealistic 
dimension of the Piecemeal method is that of freedom and the possibility to fulfil happiness by 
each one’s means and will. In the words of K. Popper, “the political demand for piecemeal (as 
opposed to Utopian) methods corresponds to the decision that the fight against suffering must 
be considered a duty, while the right to care for the happiness of others must be considered a 
privilege confined to the close circle of their friends.”
156
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 The Piecemeal approach only provides a frame, a set of rules of the game where the 
Open Society can flourish. The Piecemeal approach per se does not aim at anything other than 
allowing the emergence of the Open Society, of the freedom to criticize, of the possibility to go 
further (or not) by trial and error. It is a political framework, and as K. Popper claimed “the 
‘higher’ values should very largely be considered as ‘non-agenda’, and should be left to the 
realm of laissez faire.”
157
  
 The path to unveil the solution to this fundamental non-structural problem of 
motivation, of an apparent lack of idealism in the Piecemeal method which affects liberal 
democracies and Open Societies, will be presented in the following sections of this chapter. A 
very important point should however be concluded from this analysis: if it should exist, the 
concept of an ideal in Piecemeal Social Engineering can only be materialized, not in the 
political frame itself, but within such frame – inside the Open Society. 
 
3. An Open Society to Criticism Without Critical Spirit  
 The problems in the practical application of Piecemeal Social Engineering – structural 
and non-structural – are in general terms, sources of uncertainty in contemporary liberal 
democracies. We have seen that the structural issues are systemic, liable to be minimized with a 
higher scale of efficiency and with a superior degree of adequateness to the societies in 
question. They can naturally be tackled by the continued use of the Piecemeal approach, 
allowing Open Societies to learn with the accumulated experience in the use this kind of social 
engineering. Eventually, the issues will blend in the system without the need to intervene and 
interfere. 
 On the other hand, the non-structural issues come from the outside of the regular 
dynamics of the Piecemeal approach, being more dangerous due to their unknown, unnatural 
and seemingly powerful character. The following analysis will focus on the path to unveil the 
solution to the specific non-structural issue of the ‘Motivation Problem’. 
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3.1.  Revisiting The Importance of Critical Reasoning in the Open Society 
 In order to start preparing the ground to disclose the very beginning of the solution to 
the problem of motivation which concerns the lack of a guiding ideal in the Piecemeal method, 
it is important to revisit the concept which is at the core of where the solution may be. 
 It was stated that if there should be an idealistic dimension in this attitude, it will not be 
found in the political framework of Piecemeal Social Engineering since higher ideals cannot be 
provided by political structures. However, if we adopt a Piecemeal approach, an Open Society is 
likely to flourish. The Open Society, which combines a multiplicity of ideas, purposes and 
spheres, can provide grounding for the emergence of ideals, always based on free association 
and not on state imposition. If there should be a single or various higher ideals, they will indeed 
be guided by the principles of the Piecemeal approach to social engineering but will emerge 
within the Open Society. The Piecemeal approach is the precondition for their emergence and 
the Open Society their catalyser. Considering this, it is relevant to revoke the essential 
characteristic of the Open Society in order to understand the grounding where ideals can 
emerge. 
 Firstly, it is important to understand the circumstances behind the emergence of this 
concept. It appeared as an opposing force to the perception that reason was the search for 
certainty, and that certainty, on its turn, was liable to be achieved. K. Popper denominated this 
perspective ‘dogmatic rationalism’. It is characterized by “the new tendency … to discard 
proofs, and with them, any kind of rational argument”
158
 so that “by making argument and 
criticism impossible, he intends to make his own philosophy proof against all criticism, so that it 
may establish itself as a reinforced dogmatism, secure from every attack, and the 
unsurmountable summit of all philosophical development.”
159
 
 In strong opposition to this view, K. Popper argues that we need scientific theories to be 
formulated in a way that they can be submitted to refutation. “‘In so far as scientific statements 
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refer to the world of experience, they must be refutable; and, in so far as they are irrefutable, 
they do not refer to the world of experience.”
160
 The more 'forbidding' a theory is, the better it 
can be submitted to the test of refutation. If a theory is not forbidding enough, it cannot be 
identified as scientific. 
 This is where the concept of Open Society plays an exceptional role. It is defined by a 
society open to criticism and to contradiction, where we admit we know too little. It's a society 
where all scientific theories matter until they are refuted. Along with a “critical and fallibilist 
approach”
161
, every source of knowledge “is welcome, but no statement is immune from 
criticism, whatever its ‘source’ may be.”
162
 Hence, by scientific theory we understand every 
statement which is liable to be refuted. It is in the refutation where the most important part of 
science really is. By refuting a theory we become closer to the truth by excluding what is not 
true. “Thus we can learn, we can grow in knowledge, even if we can never know—that is, know 
for certain. Since we can learn, there is no reason for despair of reason; and since we can never 
know, there are no grounds here for smugness, or for conceit over the growth of our 
knowledge.”
163
 This is how scientific progress is conducted in the Open Society. 
 Furthermore, the Open Society is characterized by an attitude  termed ‘critical dualism’ 
which asserts that “norms and normative laws can be made and changed by man, more 
especially by a decision or convention to observe them or to alter them, and that it is therefore 
man who is morally responsible for them; not perhaps for the norms which he finds to exist in 
society when he first begins to reflect upon them, but for the norms which he is prepared to 
tolerate once he has found out that he can do something to alter them. Norms are man-made in 
the sense that we must blame nobody but ourselves for them; neither nature, nor God. It is our 
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business to improve them as much as we can, if we find that they are objectionable.”
164
 An 
Open Society is therefore distinguished by the possibility of its members to engage actively into 
critical thinking. It is a society ‘open’ to criticism. There are not any divine or natural norms 
exempt from criticism and from the possibility of being altered over time, if they cease to be 
desirable in their current design. Therefore, men have total accountability for the set of rules 
adopted within the Open Society, and are not willing to blindly accept norms merely because 
they are said to be God-given or Nature-given. Men “have learned to be to some extent critical 
of taboos, and to base decisions on the authority of their own intelligence (after discussion).”
165
  
 Hence, we arrive to the very important conclusion that the concept of Open Society is 
akin to the crucial idea of continuous criticism and of the debate of ideas by the members of a 
certain society. The denial of this essential condition of critical reasoning would mean that the 
Open Society would cease to be ‘open’ and would become ‘closed’ – to criticism – instead. 
 Bearing in mind the importance of critical reasoning as a structural concept in the Open 
Society, it makes sense to infer that a healthy Open Society is one where such mechanism 
operates effectively. The question of whether this is this really happening in contemporary Open 
Societies becomes in this context striking.  
 
3.2.  Is the Open Society Sabotaging Criticism? 
 ”If the immobility of utopia, its isolation in time and space, the absence of conflict and 
disruptive processes, is a product of poetic imagination divorced from commonplaces of reality 
– how is it that so much of recent sociological theory has been based on exactly these 
assumptions and has, in fact, consistently operated with a utopian model of society?”
166
 This 
question posed by R. Dahrendorf (1958) is extremely relevant in the context of the influence of 
Utopian thought over the social sciences and over critical reasoning within the Open Society. 
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, uniformity as absence of relevant social conflict
169
, social harmony as the 
acceptance of the status quo
170
, and the pursuit of recurrent social patterns which describe a 
dynamics which occurs inside the system and never outside it
171
. Despite arguing that “it is 
obvious that such societies do not exist – just as it is obvious that every known society changes 
its values and institutions continuously”,
172
 he asserts that “the social system as conceived by 
some recent sociological theorists appears to be characterized by the same features as those 
contained in utopian societies.”
173
 R. Dahrendorf alerts us that modern social theory is tainted 
with the avid pursuit by modern sociologists of a “conservatism of complacency”
174
, of the loss 
of problem-consciousness allied to the “turning away from the critical facts of experience”
175
, 
the abandoning of the “impulse of curiosity, the desire to solve riddles of experience”
176
and the 
tendency to formulate social problems, similarly to utopias, with a sense of a “highly general 
kind or … general laws”
177
.  
 F.A. Hayek (1949) describes a similar phenomenon while maintaining that there is a 
tendency of orthodoxy, of the “pretence that a system of ideas is final and must be 
unquestioningly accepted as a whole”
178
. This tendency occurs due to the emergence of a class 
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which he denominates the ‘intellectuals’. These, “have probably never exercised so great an 
influence as they do today”
179
 in shaping public opinion
180
. Intellectuals are “neither that of the 
original thinker nor that of the scholar or expert in a particular field of thought. The typical 
intellectual need be neither: he need not possess special knowledge of anything in particular, 




 The problem of the appearance of this class has to do with their determinant influence in 
disseminating the ideas created by the experts into the public opinion
182
 , filtering the 
information that reaches the ordinary man. “It is the intellectuals in this sense who decide what 
views and opinions are to reach us, which facts are important enough to be told to us, and in 
what form and from what angle they are to be presented.”
183
 What happens is that “it is not the 
views of experts but the views of a minority, mostly of rather doubtful standing in their 
profession, which are taken up and spread by the intellectuals”
184
.  
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 This constitutes a deep problem in the natural dynamics of Open Societies concerning 
the engagement in critical reasoning for two reasons. First, because the average intellectual is 
said to “know too little about the particular issues, his criterion must be consistency with his 
other views and suitability for combining into a coherent picture of the world.”
185
 Secondly, this 
influence of intellectuals in moulding the public debate hampers the possibility of real experts to 
have a voice in such debate, not allowing scientific evolution to be actually based on relevant 
facts, rather than on the general opinions of non-experts. F.A. Hayek addressed this second 
point by adding that “one of the main handicaps which deprives the liberal thinker of popular 
influence is closely connected with the fact that … he is not only not tempted into that long-run 
speculation … but is actually discouraged from it because any effort of this kind is likely to 
reduce the immediate good he can do.”
186
 Social scientists have increasingly focused their 
attention in the implementation of the Piecemeal approach in order to tackle ‘concrete evils’ 
than they have engaged into long-run scientific speculations, which ended up being left to the 
intellectuals. 
 Other more modern authors have also identified this phenomenon of apathy within 
Open Societies, characterized by a lack of engagement with critical thought. J. Baudrillard 
(1994) argues that "the disappearance, as if by magic, of all contradiction ... tells us that what 
we have is not a historical evolution, but an epidemic of consensus"
187
. C. Paine (1997) also 
alerted to the fact that many “American intellectuals and educators are dismayed by the crisis 
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 If this climate of orthodoxy and apathy is indeed taking place within our contemporary 
Open Societies, if it is true that there is a bottleneck in the free flow of relevant information into 
the public sphere, and if the characteristic critical spirit is weakened either because of the 
influence of a class or due to the decrease in the desire to reach further, to actively engage into 
critical debate, we are then leaning towards a society which will become crystalized within its 
own set of ideas. A static, isolated and stable society, most resembling the R. Dahrendorf’s idea 
of utopia than of a Popperian Open Society. 
 
4. Rest is Evil, Change189 is Divine 
 It has been discussed that the implementation of Piecemeal adjustments is hampered by 
a sense of lack of motivation in order to pursue piecemeal purposes. In contrast, Utopianism has 
an intrinsically idealistic dimension which seems to strongly motivate the utopian approach to 
social engineering. Furthermore, if one considers that contemporary Open Societies are to a 
certain extent losing its crucial element of critical reasoning, they may become as static as an 
utopian model when it comes to the denial of change and eventually, of progress. The 
atmosphere of apathy in contemporary Open Societies as presented above is a danger for those 
who intend to aspire at higher ideals within the piecemeal framework. It undermines the 
existence of a cause which is both more appealing and worthwhile than a utopian blueprint. If 
one does not accept accountability, the willingness to embrace the “the strain of civilization”
190
 
and to pay the price for freedom that the engagement into critical reasoning constitutes, he will 
be in path to totalitarianism. But if however, one wants to preserve freedom in liberal 
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democracies and the possibility to set their own higher ideals within the Open Society, he ought 
necessarily to engage in a constant process of criticism. 
 Change epitomizes the permanent debate of ideas, the dynamics between their 
emergence and refutation, the possibility to pursue an individual idea of happiness and to 
discard it whenever one feels likely to. Only “if we regain the problem-consciousness which has 
been lost in the decades”
191
 we will not “fail to recover the critical engagement in the realities 
of our social world which we need to do our job well.”
192
 This recovery of critical engagement 
lets us leave the utopia blueprint behind, that “world of certainty”
193
 which will not allow us to 
reach further. 
 Such great source of motivation will appear once we start engaging into the discussion 
of what we aim for our democracies, of dreaming about how we can go further even if reality 
does not go hand-in-hand with our plans, of abandoning the tendency that “once the basic 
demands of the liberal programs seemed satisfied, the liberal thinkers turned to problems of 
detail and tended to neglect the development of the general philosophy of liberalism”
194
. We 
must allow ourselves to become greatly motivated by the possibility of progress, by abandoning 
the view that liberal democracy is the final form of political framework and that the Open 
Society is conditioned by a stationary degree of openness. Taking the Open Society for granted 
will worsen the motivation problem as the possibility to reach out for more will be inexistent. 
For this reason it is crucial to develop mechanisms in order to promote a higher critical 
reasoning spirit, for instance in the scientific and in the intellectual spheres and particularly 
towards the Open Society itself. The application of Piecemeal Social Engineering in order to 
improve the current political framework translated into contemporary liberal democracies 
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should be more actively sought. Obviously, these changes can never be drastic or aiming at 
remodelling the whole framework, to avoid falling into the Utopianist fallacy. It is crucial to 
always adopt the scientific posture of aiming to refute the existing conjectures that seem to 




 Although the answer to the motivation problem is indeed an extremely hard 
undertaking, too complex for the scope of this thesis which merely aims at identifying and 
trying to unveil the beginning of the path to the solution, it seems that the way to solve it is 
through the embrace of the critical reasoning spirit applied not only into the Open Society but 
also to the Open Society itself. To avoid the crystallization and the arrest of all change which 
will not allow progress, the Popperian critical spirit, the process of Piecemeal tinkering must be 
permanently exercised and not abandoned once one arrives to the Open Society from the Closed 
Society. 
 Afterwards, the path from the Open Society to the unknown – if there is any unknown at 
all – cannot be arrested, “you will have to let the huge wave of modernity, market, glitter and 
all, roll over you and make sure that you come up again once it has passed, otherwise the risk of 
a fascist backlash will be even greater.”
196
 









                                                          
195
 If the status-quo is desirable, we are free to embrace it as it is and not proceed to its change. 
196
 DAHRENDORF, R. (1990). Reflections on the revolution in Europe: In a letter intended to have been 





 The answer to whether it is possible to act in order to solve the proposed challenges to 
the practical application of Piecemeal Social Engineering is dual since it differs according to the 
nature of each problem. 
 In the first chapter of this thesis we analysed the main differences between Utopian 
Social Engineering and Piecemeal Social Engineering. We concluded that while the Utopian 
approach is based on a higher ideal aiming at remoulding the whole society, Piecemeal Social 
Engineering aims at fighting concrete evils based on the Popperian approach to the scientific 
method of trial and error, characterized by critical reasoning. It was argued that Piecemeal 
Social Engineering is the only rational approach to social engineering since it is the only one 
which allows the way into the Open Society, the only possible way further according to K. 
Popper. Utopianism attempts the impossible quest to arrest change and lead the way back to the 
lost innocence of the closed society, to the seizure of critical thought, the return to the beasts
197
 , 
ultimately leading only to an authoritarian regime and to violence. 
 In the second chapter of this thesis we have established a crucial relationship between 
the concept of Open Society and the concept of Piecemeal Social Engineering. It was 
maintained that the former is a pre-condition to the latter since the impossibility to engage into 
critical reasoning would make it impossible to formulate conjectures and to proceed to their 
refutation according to democratic procedures, which characterizes the piecemeal attitude. Only 
within the Open Society the piecemeal approach to social engineering can flourish. It was also 
established that while Piecemeal Social Engineering is a philosophical concept, liberal 
democracy is the closest practical translation of this idea into practical terms. The vagueness in 
the formulation of the concept of Piecemeal Social Engineering, meaning that there is no such a 
thing as a guideline to be followed in order to apply such concept in practice was also raised. 
However, it was seen that this vague formulation of the piecemeal approach is most likely 
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intentional since the existence of a guideline would correspond to a blueprint and the entrance 
into the utopian domain. 
 The first two chapters of this thesis provided the pre-conditions necessary to take into 
account in order to further allow the formulation of general problems to the practical application 
of Piecemeal Social Engineering and to proceed to the analysis of whether it is possible to act 
upon them in order to unveil their solutions. 
 The analysis undertaken in the third and fourth chapters lead us to the conclusion that 
while structural issues are not liable to be solved by direct intervention, non-structural issues 
are. The path to the solution of non-structural issues, namely of the ‘Immediate and Permanent 
Adjustments’ problem and of the ‘Arbitrariness’ problem is through the continuous exercise of 
Piecemeal Social Engineering. When applied to these problems, the Piecemeal attitude will 
continuously reduce the inefficiencies that are the root of evil of these two problems. Although 
it is not possible to completely eradicate inefficiencies from the system, since human structures 
always imply human errors, the more experience gained from the practical application of the 
Piecemeal method, the more these issues will be tackled by trial and error and be reduced in 
proportion. In this case, the Open Society’s mechanism of subjecting its internal constituent 
parts to the Popperian scientific method advocated by Piecemeal Social Engineering should 
function properly in order to tackle these issues. 
 The other identified type of issues, the non-structural ones, are liable to be tackled by 
external intervention, outside the normal functioning of Piecemeal Social Engineering. The 
‘Motivation Problem’ in fighting concrete evils was categorized as a non-structural problem in 
the practical application of Piecemeal Social Engineering and characterized as the most 
dangerous one. This problem lays on the analysed assumption that ‘utopian blueprints’ provide 
a higher motivation – particularly in times of crisis in liberal democracies – to alter an 
undesirable situation in the social and political framework than the ‘piecemeal purposes’. It was 
questioned whether Piecemeal Social Engineering had or should have a higher ideal similarly to 
Utopian Social Engineering. 
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 What we may conclude is that ideals and utopias are two different concepts. The 
Piecemeal approach should not be based on a utopian blueprint since the blueprint constitutes an 
end in itself, draining all the resources and individual aspirations of each member of the Open 
Society. In that case, the society would cease to be opened as the individual purposes are 
replaced by a collectivist aspiration. Hence, the answer to whether Piecemeal Social 
Engineering should be based on a utopia to motivate action in times of great struggle is no. 
  However, one cannot deny that Piecemeal Social Engineering can be based on an ideal. 
An ideal suitable to be changed over time and which does not replace the individual will of each 
member of the Open Society by a static collective end. While one may think that ‘piecemeal 
purposes’ have no idealistic dimension, being a mere dynamics of plural actions struggling 
against concrete evils, this is not absolutely true. In contrast to the ‘utopian blueprint’ which 
portraits the dream, the ideal of a perfect society according to a certain mould, the idealistic 
dimension of the ‘piecemeal purpose’ does not aim at building the perfect society, it does not 
generalize perfection recognizes that perfection may not be at all attainable and if it is, it is a 
variable concept from man to man. By being able to choose the purpose behind a single 
piecemeal action without the necessity to coordinate the aim of such undertaking with a 
collective blueprint for society, we are in a position to choose our very own idea of perfection, 
of happiness and of personal will. Hence, we may say that the idealistic dimension of the 
plurality of ‘piecemeal purposes’ is to sustain the Tradition of Liberty, where each member of 
society is free to live according to their own will. 
 But is this idealistic dimension of ‘piecemeal purposes’ motivating enough to outshine 
the motivational character of the utopian blueprint? The answer to this question is that the 
Tradition of Liberty may not be alone a sufficiently strong motivational ideal in order to 
outshine the utopian blueprint. As we have seen, in times of great struggles even democratic 
societies sometimes preferred the power of the utopias of Nazism and Communism than that of 
liberty, in an attempt to restore order and end conflicts. 
 However, the idealistic dimension portrayed by the Tradition of Liberty is what allows 
individual blueprints to coexist within the same Open Society and to have plural ways of life. 
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This Tradition of Liberty is the foundation for the application of Piecemeal Social Engineering 
characterized by the submission of conjectures to refutation in within a democratic framework. 
Without this ideal, it is not possible to be free to exercise the use of critical reasoning. The 
idealistic dimension of ‘piecemeal purposes’ is therefore a foundation to the process of 
criticizing conjectures within the Open Society and the Open Society itself. Although we may 
have freedom to criticize, although we may have a strong ideal of liberty, if we are not proactive 
to engage into criticism such ideal is worthless. Hence, the way to solve the ‘Motivation 
Problem’ of finding a stronger motivation source than a utopic blueprint in order to change the 
social framework in times of great struggle, is perhaps through the perception that the Open 
Society itself has more to aspire than being a mere final stage of the race against the Closed 
Society. Critical reasoning should then be applied not only within the Open Society, but to the 
Open Society itself. The attitude of not accepting that the current stage of things is the final one, 
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